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Process Paper

### **Stanislav Petrov: An Unlikely Hero of the Cold War**

I initially stumbled upon Stanislav Petrov's story while surfing the web roughly a year ago. I was astonished at how I had never heard of this man before, given that he may legitimately be the only man that can say he saved the world. It was apparent that none of my peers knew about him beforehand as well. To me, the whole situation was quite comical: Stanislav Petrov, after saving the world, retired into relative obscurity and just became a regular grumpy old man that nobody would suspect of being one of humanity's greatest heroes. His story made a memorable impression on me, and when my teacher announced the theme of "taking a stand" in class, my mind instinctively jumped to his story.

We started our research by looking at the Wikipedia page for the False Alarm Incident to refresh my memory and gain a broad understanding of the event. We realized that the event itself covered only one short night, so our next step in conducting research was to look at the context and historical events preceding the False Alarm Incident. We began with getting a deeper understanding of the Cold War through its webpage on History.com. From there, we chose the events or things that we deemed the most relevant to understanding the circumstances of the False Alarm Incident. Next, we looked for further information and quote-worthy material on National Security Archive and Wilson Center Digital Archive. Other trustworthy secondary sources were referenced as well. Through our research, we hope to help the viewer comprehend all the sources of tension, how they relate to the False Alarm Incident, and how Petrov resisted and stood up to them.

We chose to use website as the medium because it was the one we were most comfortable with. Weebly's UI was particularly easy to work with. We decided on using the black and white color scheme to convey a sense of tension and danger while representing the duality of Petrov's decision. Most of our images were taken from articles on the Internet, with some screenshots of primary documents. Quotes were primarily used to provide different perspectives of the event. The False Alarm

Incident page, however, was focused on Petrov and his own feelings during the incident. We included a short “Choose your own adventure” section on the home page to function as a hook and put the viewer in Stanislav Petrov’s shoes at the time of the incident.

We interpreted “taking a stand” as making a critical decision in the face of adversities. In this case, although it seems that he did not stand against an obvious physical manifestation, he took a stand for world peace through resisting the rampant paranoia that characterized the Cold War, the irrationality often paired with it, and the strict protocol of the Soviet military. His success in maintaining his rationality and individuality in the Soviet military where compliance is rewarded may have allowed for the world to continue peacefully into the present.

Yi Chen (Luke) Chang, Danny Yu

## STANISLAV PETROV: THE UNSUNG HERO

### Primary Sources

"A.I. Mikoyan, Memorandum of Conversation with Robert Kennedy," November 30, 1962, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive; translated by David Wolff, CWIHP.  
<http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111210>

This is a document about the conversation between American and Soviet officials discussing the future of Soviet-American relations. It was a dinner meeting, with the majority of the content involving a private conversation between A.I. Mikoyan (First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union) and President R. Kennedy. The Cuban Missile Crisis has just ended a month ago, but the tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union were still a major concern. The trust between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev was under danger due to the Cuban Missile Crisis and they were trying to regain trust and maintain peace. The guests at the dinner include "R. Kennedy, Deputy Secretary of State [George] Ball, the chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisors [Walter] Heller, the chairman of the Board of Directors of the "New York Times" [Orville] Dryfoos, and the Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin." The discussions and conclusions of the meeting were meant for the general public of the U.S. and of the Soviet Union. The purpose of this meeting was 1) to discuss the future of Soviet-American relations and 2) to question each other's actions and plans. The meeting was recounted by Mikoyan, possibly containing slight preference towards the Soviet Union on the conversation. Everyone who spoke at the meeting held high governmental positions. This document extends our thesis and helps us to explain the Soviet-American relationship leading up to the incident.

Akhromeyev, Sergei. "Interview with former Soviet Head of General Staff Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev." Interview by Don Oberdorfer. National Security Archive. <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB427/docs/14.Interview%20with%20Sergei%20Akhromeyev,%201990.pdf>.

This interview was conducted in 1990, a little before the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The interviewer is a reporter on The Washington Post, so the intended audience would be the American people. Akhromeyev, the former Soviet Head of General Staff, touches upon the anxiety and paranoia within Soviet leadership in 1983 regarding the NATO exercises in Europe. He also mentioned that he believed the United States was going to wage war on the Soviet Union to consolidate world supremacy. This is a first-hand account on the paranoia that the Soviet leaders had and how 1983 compared to the years after in terms of stress and tension.

"Arms Freeze: Who Is For and Who Is Against," 1984, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1984. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110890>

This document is a pamphlet made by the Soviet Novosti Press Agency in 1984. It urges the US government to accept the proposal “mutually to freeze American and Soviet nuclear arms.” It discusses the Soviet Union’s approach to this issue and why, although the people agree to this proposal, Washington disagrees. The nuclear false-alarm incident has passed (1983) and the tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States were still a major concern. Previously, in 1960, there was a nuclear freeze proposal by the U.S. that, as argued by the document, served as an indication of superiority in nuclear weapons. The early 1980s also “witnessed powerful antiwar movements in the USA, western Europe, and the world over.” This pamphlet is meant for the general public of Russia, first published in Russian. It may also have been meant for the US government, considering its quote at the end of the pamphlet that acknowledges the benefits of the proposal. The purpose, thus, is to persuade the US government to accept the proposal because it will, at the very least, improve the relationship between the Soviet Union and the U.S., making the world safer by reducing nuclear weapons and development. Most of the information is told in the point of view of the Soviet Union, often including the Soviet Union’s perspective on the subject. This pamphlet challenges us to dive into incidents that happened after the incident concerning Soviet-American relations and relating that to Petrov’s decision in 1983.

*Disciplinary Code of the Armed Forces.* June 1, 1946. Minister of Armed Forces of the USSR, Disciplinary Code of the Armed Forces of the USSR. <http://soviethistory.msu.edu/1947-2/xenophobia/xenophobia-texts/disciplinary-code-of-the-armed-forces/>.

This was the disciplinary code of the armed forces of the Soviet military in 1946, near the very beginning of the Cold War. The intended audience would be the people in the Soviet military. This disciplinary code solidly displays the strict attitude that the military has towards total and exact obedience to the orders and instructions of commanders through its emphasis on the relationship between a commander and his subordinates. Although Stanislav Petrov was not a member of the armed forces at the time of the incident, the same concept of absolute obedience to one’s superiors should also extend to Stanislav Petrov’s field.

Draper, Thomas C. Oldham, and Warren H. Horton. *MILITARY LAW REVIEW (Pamphlet NO. 27-100-5)*. Washington D.C., MD: Department of the Army, 1959.

[https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military\\_Law/Military\\_Law\\_Review/pdf-files/276863~1.pdf](https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Military_Law_Review/pdf-files/276863~1.pdf).

This was a pamphlet issued by the Department of the Army on Soviet military law in 1959, during the middle of the Cold War. It was written by military lawyers for other fellow military lawyers to share their experiences and research. This source examines a variety of topics, but the most pertinent to our research is about disobedience. It analyzes the disciplinary code and the oath of the army and reveals an “elaborate system of rewards for good service

conferred by the same disciplinary code which imposes harsh penalties for disobedience.” In the context of the False Alarm Incident, although Petrov disobeyed protocol, he also did a good service; yet, he was still punished by being forced into early retirement.

*Formal investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Downing of Iran Air Flight 655 on 3 July 1988.* August 19, 1988. Washington, D.C.<http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA203577>.

This is an investigation report made by the US Secretary of Defense regarding the downing of Iran Air Flight 665 in 1988. The report dove into detail about the circumstances in which the Captain made his mistake, and uses that to justify that what he did as within the realm of reason as per the Rules of Engagement. This incident provides a counter-example as to why Stanislav Petrov’s decision was significant: the captain of the ship was presented with misinformation much like Stanislav Petrov did, but he failed to use his higher judgement and simply followed protocol, which lead to the deaths of all 290 passengers on board.

"Fourth Conversation between N.S. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong, Hall of Qinjiadiang [Beijing]," August 03, 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, f. 52, opis 1, delo 498, ll. 151-156, copy in Volkogonov Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Translated by Vladislav M. Zubok.

This primary source was a document and translation of a meeting/conversation in 1958 between N.S. Khrushchev (leader of the Soviet Union) and Mao Zedong in Beijing. China was allied with Soviet Union during that time, when nuclear weapons were being developed and tested. The two central powers at that time, the United States and Soviet Union, were having continuous conflicts regarding the creation and testing of atomic weapons and of possible war. The United States was building military bases in parts of the world, primarily around the Soviet Union. Both countries were also preparing for potential war against each other. There was no intended audience other than the people at the meeting. It was just a conversation to communicate ideas and subjects of important matter. After the conversation, a communiqué was signed. The purpose of this meeting was to share opinions about certain topics like the president of the United States and the actions needed to deal with U.S. military bases and development of more powerful missiles. Since they were allied, they shared more open opinions with each other regarding the United States and their current condition. After looking at this source, we understood more about the context of the Cold War and about the relationships between different countries during that time. It led us to a more general focus on the Cold War and why a single computer system error could have ended the world.

Halloran, Richard. 1988. "Limits To An F-14 Threat Cited By Military Aides". *New York Times*.  
<http://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/07/world/limits-to-an-f-14-threat-cited-by-m>

ilitary-aides.html.

This is an article concerning the Iranian Flight 655 that was shot down in 1988 by the United States. The Soviet Union shot down the Korean Airline Flight 007 five years later, showing a similarity in the paranoia that characterized the Cold War. Just like how the Soviet Union provides evidence to try and justify themselves in shooting down a civilian aircraft, the United States does too. For example, “J. Daniel Howard, the Pentagon’s chief spokesman, told reporters Tuesday that an Iranian F-14 could have threatened American ships with anti-ship missiles capable of causing much more damage than weapons the plane normally carries.” This was a news article and was intended for all American people to read and learn about. The purpose was to inform and discuss the different assessments of this event from eyewitnesses. As a well-known American newspaper in 1988, the article would not have leaked out too much information to the Soviet Union. We wanted to learn more about the Iranian Flight because we planned on including it as one of the examples on our Significance page; the article, however, did not include a lot of details about the event.

Horsey, David. "Preliminary Disarmament Talks..." Cartoon. The Opper Project. <http://hti.osu.edu/opper/lesson-plans/nuclear-weapons/images/preliminary-disarmament-talks>.

This is a political cartoon depicting the Arms Race by the American cartoonist David Horsey. It was published in 1983, the same year of the False Alarm Incident and after the bulk of the Arms Race had taken place. Since it was published in the popular newspaper *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, it was intended for the general American public to see. The cartoon parodies the lyrics of the *Anything You Can Do* song to his thoughts on the Arms Race being a meaningless competition, much like the content in the song. Although the author is American, both sides are criticized equally, if not the American side more. We used this cartoon as a visual to accompany our section on the Arms Race and also to visually represent the massive amount of nuclear weapons that both sides had. It supports our assertion that if a nuclear war was sparked, like in almost did in the False Alarm incident, it would cause unimaginable destruction.

“Information on the Results of the Second Round of Soviet-American Negotiations on the Limitation and Reduction of Strategic Armaments," January 31, 1983, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Archives. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118828>

This a report on the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the US about nuclear arms reduction. It was written in the January of 1983, when Ronald Reagan was the president of the US and had adopted a more aggressive foreign policy. The report was written only for the Soviet leaders to read. The report stated that they were unable to come upon a compromise as the US delegation “kept a notorious one-sided approach at obtaining military advantage for the United States.” These actions of the US placed pressure on

the Soviet Union, as the US refused to back down and they did not reach a satisfactory agreement.

Kataev, VitaliiLeonidovich. "Interview of Kataev." Interview by John G. Hines. The National Security Archive.<http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb285/vol%20II%20Kataev.PDF>

This interview was conducted in 1993, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Since the interviewer and the company that he worked under was American, this interview is intended to inform the American people. Kataev, the Former Senior Advisor to the Chairman of the Central Committee Defense Industry Department, elaborates on the "Dead Hand" and confirms that it "was definitely operational by the early 1980s." That it was operational in the time leading up to the 1983 shows that the Soviet Union was anticipating a possible nuclear strike that would destroy Soviet leadership.

Korobushin, VarfolomeiVladimirovich. "Interview of Korobushin." Interview by John G. Hines. The National Security Archive.<http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb285/vol%20II%20Korobushin.PDF>

This interview was conducted in 1992, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Since the interviewer and the company that he worked under was American, this interview is intended to inform the American people. Korobushin, the former Soviet Deputy Chief of Staff of Strategic Rocket Forces, reveals the existence of the "Dead Hand", a nuclear fail-safe that would return retaliatory missiles automatically. The "Dead Hand" that the Soviet Union had prepared shows how utterly ready the Soviet Union was for mutually assured destruction.

"Letter from Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy," October 24, 1962, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Library of Congress <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111552>

This primary source is a letter from Khrushche to Kennedy on October 24<sup>th</sup>, 1962, during the Cuban Missile Crisis. United States and the Soviet Union have been negotiating primarily about the ballistic missiles that Soviet Union had in Cuba and the ones that the US had in Italy and Turkey. This letter specifically discusses the quarantine that Kennedy, the president of US, had established in Cuba. This was sent specifically to President Kennedy but was probably meant for the US government. Khrushche says that the Soviet government sees the quarantine in Cuba as an ultimatum and that the US will use force if there are disagreements. Nevertheless, Khrushche still tries to persuade the Kennedy of the unjustness of the quarantine and re-emphasize on the actions they will take if the US was to continue with their blockade. As the First Secretary of the Soviet Union, Khrushche displays strong emotion throughout his letter, directly stating the wrongdoings of President Kennedy and of his decision. Most of the content of this letter is irrelevant to our thesis, but the seriousness of the language used and the threats made by both Khrushche and Kennedy can help us understand the severity of the crisis and

of the relationship between them.

Lynn, Vera. *We'll Meet Again*. By Ross Parker and Hughie Charles. 1939, CD.

This song was published in 1939. It was played along a very iconic scene where a nuclear bomb was dropped in the movie *Dr. Strangelove*, which is about nuclear war. We used this song as a reference to that scene and also to set the atmosphere.

"Meeting Minutes of the Politburo of the CC CPSU, Regarding Western Plans for Deployment of New Nuclear Weapons in Europe," May 31, 1983, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 53, Ll. 1-14. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115981>

This is a document about the discussion amongst the Communist Party of the Soviet Union concerning their response to the "Western decision to deploy new nuclear weapons in Europe". They talked about meeting with European countries and their socialist allies and proposing a response of peace. Chairman Andropov Yuri V. and many other comrades were present at this discussion. This discussion took place in May 1983, four months before the false alarm incident. The West, U.S. in particular, has decided to deploy new nuclear weapons in Europe. The intended audience of the discussion was amongst themselves, and the paper documenting this discussion was kept secret. It may be assumed that the conclusions of this discussion, however, were shared with officials of other countries. The purpose of this discussion was to come up with a response to the decision made by the US to deploy new nuclear weapons in Europe. The point of view is of comrades Gromyko and Zimyanin, both from the communist party of the Soviet Union, who were tasked to record the discussion on paper. Thus, the paper contains a preference for Soviet decisions and their stance. This document expands our thesis slightly by adding more details on the tension and decisions between the US and the Soviet Union before the false alarm incident.

"Memorandum of Conversation, Ambassador Dobrynin with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance," March 21, 1977, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Russian Foreign Ministry archives, Moscow; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116951>

This document is on Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to the US, discussing with the US Secretary Vance about restricting nuclear arsenal. The conversation took place in 1977, during the middle of the Cold War when both sides had fairly powerful and accurate ICBMs. This was a top secret document intended for the Soviet leaders. The document shows that the Soviet leaders were affected and keenly aware of the threat of America's nuclear weapons.

"National Security Council Report, NSC 68, 'United States Objectives and Programs for National Security'," April 14, 1950, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, US National Archives. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116191>

This primary source, written in 1950, contains a report concerning "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security", a letter by the



president regarding the report, and another letter by the Executive Secretary, all sent to the National Security Council. The world had just finished two world wars, numerous revolutions, and the fall of major empires. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have come to power, and with the gradual development of nuclear weapons, were on the edge of an atomic war. The letter was intended for high political and military leaders and organizations, more specifically “the National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Economic Cooperation Administrator, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisors”. It was noted that the report should remain in privacy and shared only with the decision of the president. The purpose of both the letter and the report was to discuss further actions and procedures of the United States regarding national security and of the Soviet Union. The report and both of the letters were written by American governmental leaders. It was meant for communication within highly private organizations and would contain some amount of preference towards their own country. This source expanded the possibilities of our topic and the things we could cover. It provides both a general insight of the world status prior to the Cold War and a specific understanding of why Stanislav Petrov’s decision might have caused war.

Perle, Richard. "Mutually Assured Destruction as a Strategic Policy." *The American Journal of International Law* 67, no. 5 (November 1973), 39-40. Accessed March 21, 2017. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/25660475.pdf>.

This is a section of a journal published in November 1973. The two pages mainly focus on Mutually Assured Destruction and the analysis of it. The author argues that the Soviet Union will not initiate an attack but will still remain a threat with its capable weaponry. The journal is meant for Americans, as he uses ‘we’ regarding the United States. The author is also American. The purpose is to provide an analysis of MAD and propose future plans to counter the Soviet forces. This source will be useful in analysis of MAD and its impact on the Cold War.

"Pershing II Missile." *Coldwar.org*. n.d. Cold War Gallery. [http://www.coldwar.org/pictures/photo\\_gallery/21.jpg](http://www.coldwar.org/pictures/photo_gallery/21.jpg).

This is an image of a Pershing II Missile of the United States beginning a flight test to the White Sands Missile Range. This type of missile replaced the previous Pershing 1a missile as the United States’ primary nuclear-capable theater-level weapon. It shows the continuous tension throughout the Cold War and the significant role nuclear weapons played in the war. This also relates to MAD in a way that both countries are constantly trying to improve their equipment to be able to counter possible attacks or to gain technological and weaponry superiority. The image was meant for mainly people of the United States; it simply recorded a military event that happened.

Petrov, Stanislav. "Interview of StanislavPetrov." Interview by Tom Barton. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oX83EzDofrc>

This is a short interview of Stanislav Petrov in 2010 and was broadcast on television. He describes his experience and feelings during the incident, and also that “[he] knew [his] decision would have a lot of consequences.” It was emphasized in his interview about how he was totally aware of the missiles, that the responsibility lied on him to approach this situation, and how he acted accordingly. One may say that he is exaggerating his own significance in the incident, but I believe that he should be given the benefit of the doubt. He is pretty much one of the only sources about the incident since it was kept secret and also the subject of the story himself. If his intention was to boast, then he could have done it a decade ago.

"Protocol of the extraordinary meeting of the Committee of Ministers for Defense from the Warsaw Treaty member states," October 20, 1983, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Federal Archives of Germany, Military Branch. Translated for CWHIP by Bernd Schaefer. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111734>

This primary source is minutes of the meeting of the Committee of Ministers for Defense from the Warsaw Treaty member states. At the time of the meeting, the Cold War was at high intensity, and the U.S. was trying to deploy “medium-ranged” nuclear missiles in Europe to establish military superiority. It was a confidential document only available in the government archives. The contents of the document elaborates on the issue of how the Soviet states should respond to the U.S.’s deployment of nuclear missiles. The members of the meeting were Ministers of Defense of the Soviet states under the Warsaw Treaty. This source shows how ready the Soviet Union was to retaliate to possible U.S. nuclear strikes. It displays the alternate reality that if Stanislav has warned the president, and the retaliation that would follow. Thus, this source brings to light that the entire world’s peace is at stake when Stanislav took his stand.

Reagan, Ronald. "Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security." Address, Feb. & March, 1983.

This is a speech by Ronald Reagan in 1983 about the development of the Strategic Defense Initiative program. It was broadcast on national radio and television, so it was intended for all Americans to hear. Reagan’s main purpose in this speech is to convince the people and Congress to allow for a defense program that could deflect the ICBMs of the Soviet Union. Ronald Reagan emphasizes the fact that Soviet military has already caught up with the United States military in order to convince civilians about the danger of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union should be alarmed at the defense program itself and the aggressive attitude in the speech.

Reagan, Ronald. "Foreword Written for a Report on the Strategic Defense Initiative." National Archives and Records Administration. December 28, 1984. Accessed November 20, 2016

This is a foreword written by Ronald Reagan on a report on SDI a year after the original “Star Wars” speech. At this time, the concept of SDI has matured

more and Reagan was able to elaborate more on its effects realistically. It is his duty as the president to inform the American people of his intent and purposes behind his project. In his writing, he recognizes the delicate balance of mutually assured destruction, but also argues that the SDI is necessary for the world to move onto a time where the threat of nuclear destruction does not constantly loom over countries; hence, he admits that the SDI is challenging the precarious state of mutually assured destruction. In addition, he also mentions the treaties to reduce nuclear arms; when coupled with the SDI program, it supports our assertion that Petrov's decision was particularly exceptional given the geopolitically tense state of affairs.

"Soviet Report on the American Preparation of War During the Cuban Missile Crisis," October 31, 1962, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP archive. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114527>

This is a report written during the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962). It talks about the state of Washington during the preparation for war in Cuba. The Cuban Missile Crisis was a 13-day negotiation period between Soviet Union and US concerning their actions and rights in Cuba. It was caused by the establishment of Soviet missiles in Cuba. After nearly a week of negotiating, in Washington, many right-wing officials were enthusiastic about war, even appealing other people to go to war. This report was intended for and sent to "Khrushchev, Kozlov, Suslov, Ponomarev, Gromyko", high officials in the Soviet government. The purpose of this report is to provide information about the impact of the negotiations that they are having with the US. By discussing the possibility of war being initiated by the US, Soviet officials would be able to either prepare their military forces or to consider negotiating more for peace. The reporter talks about the condition of Washington through a firsthand experience of the reports and newspapers at that time. The report being a telegram sent to high Soviet officials suggests that the reporter is part of the Soviet Union instead of the US. This report provides evidence for a similar situation of a possibility of war between the Soviet Union and the US, relating to our thesis and the importance of Petrov's decision. It also adds to the tension between the two countries leading up to the 1983 false alarm incident.

Stalin, Joseph. 1939. "Oath Of Allegiance Of The Workers' And Peasants' Red Army". Note. London. Works. Marxists Internet Archive (2008).

This is an oath of allegiance that Stalin wrote for citizens of the USSR to promise loyalty, honesty, and bravery in guarding the Soviet Union against its enemies. The note was made in February 1939, a few months before World War II started. It was clear that the Soviet Union needed to motivate faith and belief in the state to secure its people and to secure the communist ideology. This oath specifically applied to citizens of the USSR to "[join] the ranks of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army" and to be a true citizen of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The purpose of this oath was also to threaten people in staying loyal to the state: if they were to break the oath, "the stern punishment of the Soviet law and the universal hatred and contempt of the

working people [would] fall upon [them].” The “enemy” stated in the oath, as from a Soviet perspective, would change as time passes; examples include Germany, capitalism, the United States, etc. We plan to use this source in our home page of the website to show the consequences of breaking the oath and the Soviet law.

"Stasi Note on Meeting Between Minister Mielke and KGB Deputy Chairman Kryuchkov," September 19, 1983, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU), MfS, ZAIG 5306, pp. 1-19. Translated by Bernd Schaefer. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115718>

This is a document about a “meeting between KGB Deputy Chairman Kryuchkov and East German Minister for State Security Mielke”. Additional participants include comrade Lieutenant General Shumilov from KGB (Committee for State Security) and comrade Major Generals Grossmann and Damm from East Germany. They primarily discuss the shoot down of Flight 007 of the Korean Airlines. This was two weeks after the shoot down (the Soviet Union falsely identified a passenger plane as of military use and shot it down) and a week before the false alarm incident. The direct audiences were the two interpreters present (one from each side) but possibly also to other officials of the Soviet Union, East Germany, and other allies of the USSR. The purpose of this discussion was to discuss the shoot down and causes of this decision, but furthermore, to communicate ways to respond to inquiries of the US and Japan. They also talked about the struggle for peace and negotiations with the US. The point of view is the two interpreters from East Germany. This document does not contribute a lot to our thesis, but some details about the maintenance of peace two weeks before the false alarm incident may still prove useful.

"Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 29 October 1962," October 29, 1962, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Szyfrogramy from Hawana 1962, 6/77 w-82 t-1264, Polish Foreign Ministry Archive (AMSZ), Warsaw. Obtained by James G. Hershberg (George Washington University) and translated by Margaret K. Gnoinska (Troy University). <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115768>

This is a telegram from the Polish Embassy in Havana (Jelen) to Krajewski, an official in the Polish Foreign Ministry. Jelen talks about several diplomatic actions that took place during the recent Cuban Missile Crisis. The Cuban Missile Crisis has just ended a day ago, and USSR had recently withdrawn military installations in Cuba while the US spoke to not invade Cuba. A speech was then made regarding this decision in Santiago, Cuba. The intended audience of this telegram is specifically Krajewski, but may have been meant for other officials of the Polish Foreign Ministry as well. The purpose of this telegram was to talk and inform about Cuban responses to the USSR’s decision to withdraw their military from Cuba and Cuba’s reaction to USSR’s claim that the military is solely theirs. Jelen also touched on other unrelated

diplomatic issues as well. This telegram was written by Jelen, a Polish Embassy, who was on the side of the USSR during the Cold War. This telegram provides little valuable information to our thesis because it mainly deals with Cuba's response to the Soviet Union, not relating to the US. However, it may still be used in summarizing the events of the Cuban Missile Crisis in relation to the false alarm incident (also a missile crisis) nearly 21 years later.

"Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 30 November 1962," November 30, 1962, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Szyfrogramy from Waszyngton 1962, 6/77 w-86 t-1312, Polish Foreign Ministry Archive (AMSZ), Warsaw. Obtained by James G. Hershberg (George Washington University) and translated by Margaret K. Gnoinska (Troy University). <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115790>

This is a document sent to the Poland's foreign minister about the conversation between officials of the Soviet Union and President Kennedy. The author, Edward Drozniak (Poland's ambassador to the US) has written this summary with a participant of the conversation, Comrade Mikoyan. In the conversation, President Kennedy and Mikoyan discuss issues in Cuba, including a non-aggression promise towards Cuba and flights across Cuba made by the US. The Cuban Missile Crisis was nearing its end, with negotiations ending. The actions that both countries can take in Cuba were still a major concern during the time of the conversation. This summary was sent to foreign minister of Poland Adam Rapacki but may be intended for a more general audience of Polish officials. The purpose of this telegram was to inform about the possible actions each side may take in regards to Cuba, something the whole world was aware of during that time. This telegram was written and was sent to Polish officials. This source still proves valuable because of its outsider perspective and challenges our thesis to connect the decisions and promises made by both sides during the Cuban Missile Crisis to the 1983 false alarm incident more than twenty years later.

"The Soviet Crisis And Flight 007". 1983. *Arms Control Today* 13 (10): 2-3. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23623038.pdf>.

This is a general overview of the concepts behind the Korean Airline Flight 007 Shootdown and whether the Soviet Union should be justified for it. Various aspects are discussed, including the overextension of Soviet military, the paranoia of Soviet officials and intelligence committees, examples of flying spies, and the lack of understanding between the USSR and the United States. The author also criticizes the Soviet system to be "one in which the military officers are not worldly wise, in which the machinery does not always work, and in which accidents appear to be more prevalent and dangerous in our own [U.S.] system." The intended audience is the American people since this is from a magazine. The purpose is to discuss the incident and provide information to its audience through data and analysis. These two pages clearly represent an American perspective on the Korean Airline Incident as it

addresses the Soviet Union as “they”. After reading these two pages of the magazine, we are encouraged to seek more information concerning the Soviet view of this event and how it impacted their political standpoints.

*The President's Strategic Defense Initiative*. March 1985. A 1985 description of the Reagan administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative., Bureau of Public Affairs, Dept. of State, Washington, D.C. <https://dp.la/primary-source-sets/sources/554/>.

This was a classified government document about the SDI program, and it goes over the details of how the defense mechanisms would work and its purpose in regards to strengthening deterrence. Although it was written in 1985, after the False Alarm incident, it still provides useful insight on SDI nonetheless. The concept of deterrence using SDI is explained very clearly in this document: by weakening the impact of attacks of the Soviet Union, it would imply to the Soviet Union that the United States would be free to retaliate. In other words, it would be less effective for the Soviet Union to attack the United States, which would tip a possible nuclear conflict to the United States favor.

*The Soviet "War Scare"*. PDF. The National Security Archive, February 15, 1990. <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb533-The-Able-Archer-War-Scare-Declassified-PFIAB-Report-Released/2012-0238-MR.pdf>

This was a classified report made by the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in 1990, just a year before the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This document gives an American perspective into how they thought the Soviet Union would react and how it actually reacted. The document reveals that in 1983, when NATO was conducting their military exercises called Able Archer, the Soviet Union responded through military and intelligence activities that were usually reserved only for crises. The document also speculates on the psyches of the Soviet leaders, which are actually shockingly similar to the actual thoughts as revealed by the interviews we looked at.

"Transcript, Meeting of East German leader Erich Honecker and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, Crimea, 25 July 1978 (excerpt)," July 25, 1978, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Stiftung “Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR” im Bundesarchiv (SAPMO-BArch) Berlin, DY30 JIV 2/201/1495. Obtained and translated by Christian Ostermann. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117047>

This is a report on a meeting between Secretary E. Honecker (General Secretary of the German Democratic Republic) and L.I. Brezhnev (General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union) about Soviet-American relations and the situations in China and Southeast Asia. In 1978, five years before the nuclear false-alarm incident, East Germany was under the control of the Soviet Union. Soviet-American relations were still tense and the U.S. was leading in the arms race. The intended audience of this

conversation is high officials of East Germany and of the Soviet Union. The purpose of this meeting is to discuss the decisions and actions of the U.S. towards the Soviet Union and towards other Socialist countries. The two general secretaries concluded that they need to stay together to deal with the threats that the U.S. and its allies poses. In the meeting, there are some disregard and speculation about events such as the meeting between A.A. Gromyko and C. Vance and the trials against Shcharansky and Ginzburg. Most of this document is unrelated to our thesis, but the decisions that the secretaries decide to make in response to actions of the U.S. can help us understand the more specific impacts of increased Soviet-American tension and possible nuclear war.

"USSR Civil Defense". 1962. *The Science News-Letter* 82 (20): 319. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3944818.pdf>.

During the Cold War, the USSR and the United States constantly developed nuclear technology; their nuclear missiles were capable of extreme destruction if they hit on target. Because of this fear of war, the Soviet Union spent great amounts of money on a program to ensure that every Soviet citizen were capable of civil defense. Unlike the Soviet Union, the United States concentrated on constructing fall-out shelters for protection from H-bombs. In 1962 specifically, the Cuban Missile Crisis stimulated public attention to civil defense; citizens of both countries desired a raise in civil defense because they felt that more money spent would mean better protection. As part of *The Science News-Letter*, an American magazine, this article is intended for all Americans. This article is meant to inform Americans about the civil defense conditions of both the USSR and the United States. Although the article title is USSR Civil Defense, this article still takes on the perspective of an outsider by providing statistics and responses to the civil defense of both countries. Comparisons and contrasts are made between the two countries. This source adds on to the context of the Cold War specifically with each country's decision on civil defense and to the possible results if Petrov alerted the president.

## Secondary Sources

1945-1998. Directed by Isao Hashimoto.

This is a short film made by the Japanese Artist Isao Hashimoto in 2003. It artistically shows each nuclear bomb explosion throughout the Cold War. We used this short film to demonstrate the massive amount of nuclear bombs that the United States and the Soviet Union had.

"1945-1998" by Isao Hashimoto." CTBTO. Accessed May 07, 2017. <http://www.ctbto.org/specials/1945-1998-by-isao-hashimoto/>.

This is the website where we got the short film (above) from. It states some information about the film and his intentions in creating it. It contains information about how and why he made it. We used a quote from him in this article to accompany the video.

"1988: US Warship Shoots Down Iranian Airliner". 2017. *News.Bbc.Co.Uk*. [http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/3/newsid\\_4678000/4678707.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/3/newsid_4678000/4678707.stm).

Published by BBC News, this article gives an overview over the Iranian Airliner which was mistook by the United States as an F-14 fighter plane and shot down. It was actually an Airbus A300 and nearly three hundred passengers died. The article also briefly addresses the US response to this shoot down. It took place on July 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1988, three years before the end of the Cold War. The publisher, BBC, is a credible news site and also widely known for its documentaries and informational articles. It is part of a section on BBC News called "On This Day". Although this may be another event of the Cold War portraying the consequences of war and terror, this happened five years after the False Alarm Incident and therefore would not help us much.

Aksenov, Pavel. "StanislavPetrov: The Man Who May Have Saved the World." *BBC Europe* (BBC News), September 26, 2013. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24280831>.

This article is written by PavelAkesnov, a defense and aerospace correspondent at BBC Russian service. Using information from interviewing Stanislav Petrov, the protagonist of the story, it details on the thought process of Stanislav during the incident in 1983. He puts emphasis on Stanislav going against protocol and his training, to possibly save the world. The important is all the things he went against in that moment to produce a peaceful ending. This article gives insight to what Stanislav was thinking in the situation; its emphasis on the things Stanislav did to overcome this predicament supports the thesis of Stanislav taking a stand.

Andrews, Evan. "5 Cold War Close Calls." October 16, 2013. Accessed February 10, 2017.

<http://www.history.com/news/history-lists/5-cold-war-close-calls>.

This is an article about cold war close calls written by Evan Andrews, who has written multiple articles on History.com, a well-known website about



historical events. We used the facts provided about the False Alarm Incident from this article.

Berry, Lynn. "The man who saved the world': Former Soviet Officer Credited with Averting Nuclear War Says His Decision Was 50/50." September 17, 2015. Accessed January 3, 2017. <http://www.businessinsider.com/the-man-who-saved-the-world-former-soviet-officer-credited-with-averting-nuclear-war-says-his-decision-was-5050-2015-9>

This is an article from Business Insider, a famous political associated press. We used the picture of Stanislav Petrov posing in his house.

Cahill, Mike. 2015. "This Man Single-Handedly Stopped A Nuclear Apocalypse In 1983". Creepybasement.Com. <http://www.creepybasement.com/stanislav-petrov/>.

This is an article about Stanislav Petrov and his action in saving the world, published by Creepy Basement. We used an image of the radar system in our website.

Castella, Tom. "How Did We Forget about Mutually Assured Destruction?" *BBC Magazine* (BBC News), February 15, 2012. <http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-17026538>.

Tom de Castella published this article under BBC, a renowned scientific and historical magazine. The article details on what is Mutually Assured Destruction, how it came to be, and how it was used throughout the Cold War. M.A.D. is an agreement between countries that if one country first decides to fire their nukes, then the other country will retaliate with their own nukes, resulting in the devastation of both countries. This brings up the interesting point of how long range nukes revolutionized war; nothing can come close to them in the destruction that they cause. This articles helps us better understand our topic on the 1983 False Alarm incident; due to the concept of M.A.D., Stanislav Petrov was pressured into retaliating, or else his entire country may have to pay.

Depiction of the Concept of the Strategic Defense Initiative. Digital image. GlobalSecurity.org. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/sdi.htm>.

This is an image that shows the concept of Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative. Through this image, the viewer should be able to tell that the United States had conducted many methods in researching on how to deflect ICBMs. We used this image to accompany the section on the Strategic Defense Initiative.

*Encyclopædia Britannica*. Encyclopædia Britannica, 2013.s.v "ICBM: Missile." Accessed

February 6, 2017. <https://global.britannica.com/technology/ICBM>.

This is an article about the ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile) on Encyclopædia Britannica written by the editors. It is a trustworthy encyclopedia. We used the short description for reference and verification.

*Encyclopædia Britannica*. Encyclopædia Britannica, 2015. s.v “Nuclear test-ban treaty | 1963.” Accessed November 13, 2016. <https://www.britannica.com/event/Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty>

This article is published inside the Encyclopedia Britannica and is written by Lawrence Freeman, a professor in the Department of War Studies at King’s College, University of London. This article goes over what caused the creation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and how it was upheld over the years. From the treaty, all tests on Nuclear weapons must be held underground. The fact that Nuclear weapon tests were held underground meant that neither side would be able to know what the other side had in store. This article is helpful because it explains the paranoia and why a sudden missile attack from America may not seem as crazy to the Russians.

*Encyclopædia Britannica Kids*.s.v “Andropov, Yuri.” Accessed February 9, 2017. <http://kids.britannica.com/comptons/art-136326/Yuri-Andropov>.

This is Encyclopedia Britannica, but for kids. There is a picture of Yuri Andropov and a short bibliography. We used the picture on our website.

Fábrega, Óscar.“STANISLAV PETROV (El Hombre QueNosSalvó a Todos).” 2015. Accessed February 9, 2017. <http://plqhq.blogspot.com/2011/09/stanislav-petrov-el-hombre-que-nos.html>.

This is a Spanish website about Stanislav Petrov. We used a picture of Stanislav Petrov from this website on our homepage and cropped it to fit one of the other pictures.

Freeman, Colin. “How Did One Grumpy Russian Halt Armageddon?” *The Telegraph* May 11, 2015,. Accessed November 20, 2016. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/film/the-man-who-saved-the-world/nuclear-war-tr ue-story/>.

This article is written by Colin Freeman, the Chief Foreign Correspondent for Telegraph, a newspaper based in the UK. This article focuses more on Stanislav Petrov and his life after that fateful day on 1983, rather than purely the event itself. For his failure to keep write an accurate log during that day, he was reprimanded by the authorities. Due to the whole facility being top-secret, the information about the 1983 False Alarm incident was not released until 1998. He lived an impoverished life in the outskirts of Russia, taking care of his cancer-ridden wife. He himself only stated that he was “just in the right place at the right time”. This article is helpful because it gives insight on the aftermath of the 1983 False Alarm incident. We know that Stanislav Petrov was not commended for his important decision but rather reprimanded.

Garwin, Richard L. "Technical Aspects of Ballistic Missile Defense." The Garwin Archive. Accessed March 06, 2017. <https://fas.org/rlg/garwin-aps.htm>.

This is a report on the specifications on ICBM. It was presented at the Arms Control and National Security Session in 1999, so its facts should be extensively researched and reviewed. We cited this source to show the speed of an ICBM.

"Google Maps." Accessed December 22, 2017. <http://maps.google.com>.

Google is one of the most reputable companies, and is widely known for its search engine. Millions of people use their satellite based maps on a daily basis. On Google Maps, I found a modern image of Serpukhov-15

Gordon, Michael. 1996. "Ex-Soviet Pilot Still Insists KAL 007 Was Spying". *Nytimes.Com*.

<http://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/09/world/ex-soviet-pilot-still-insists-kal-007-w-as-spying.html>.

This is an article concerning the KAL Flight that was shot down in 1983 by the Soviet Union. General Osipovich, responsible for shooting down the civilian airliner, discusses his thoughts and decision-making during the incident. This was published by the New York Times, a well-known and credible news publisher in the United States. We used a quote from Osipovich in our website.

"Gulag-Themed Holidays Are All The Rage In Sunny Siberia". 2014. [Huffingtonpost.com](http://www.huffingtonpost.com).

[http://www.huffingtonpost.com/roadtrippers/gulag-themed-holidays-are\\_b\\_5182915.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/roadtrippers/gulag-themed-holidays-are_b_5182915.html).

This is an article concerning gulag holidays on Huffington Post. We used the first image of labor workers in our website.

History.com staff. "Cuban Missile Crisis - Cold War." *history.com* 2010,. Accessed November 13, 2016. <http://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/cuban-missile-crisis>.

This journal article is published on History.com, a reputable and well-known organization that, as its name suggests, deals with interesting stories in history. However, there article isn't credited to a specific person, but rather the "History.com staff". This journal article summarizes the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. It gives context about the cold war and that nuclear war may erupt at any moment. This article broadened our knowledge about the closest moments to nuclear war. This event, despite happening more than two decades earlier, was similar in the sense that the war was on the brink of nuclear war. However, the Cuban Missile Crisis is mostly a diplomatic event solved after compromises from both the American and the Soviet Union, unlike the 1983 False Alarm incident, which was decided by a single person. The Cuban Missile Crisis shows how paranoid both sides were at having nuclear weapons

being aimed them.

History.com. "Korean Airlines Flight Shot down by Soviet Union." *history.com* 2009,. Accessed November 20, 2016. <http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/korean-airlines-flight-shot-down-by-soviet-union>.

This article is written by the History.com staff, and published under History.com. It gives a summary on the events of September 1, 1983. On that date, a commercial Korean plane strayed off course and happened to fly too close to where some "top-secret Russian military installations were located". The plane was shot down, resulting in the deaths of all passengers aboard. The rest of the world was appalled at this, especially the U.S., and their relationship quickly soured even further. This event is helpful for us because it was twenty five days before the 1983 False Alarm incident. Being in close proximity, this event heightened the suspicions that Russia had for the U.S., and explains for the paranoia from Russia.

History.com. "5 Cold War Close Calls - History Lists." *History* 2013,. Accessed November 25, 2016. <http://www.history.com/news/history-lists/5-cold-war-close-calls>.

This article is published under History.com. It gives a list of the five closest moments of war during the Cold War. Among those five include the Cuban Missile crisis and the 1983 False Alarm incident, which we were aware about. However, on the list was also the Able Archer 83 exercise. Able Archer is a annual military exercise to simulate how the United States would react if the Soviet Union attacked Europe. In 1983, the Able Archer exercise was enhanced, with 19000 troops airlifted to Europe and the United States changed its alert status to DEFCON 1, which was usually reserved for war. The Soviet Union was very paranoid about Able Archer 83, and prepared countermeasures of their own, in the form of nuclear arsenal and fighter jets. This article is helpful because it shows the paranoia that the Soviet Union had and that both countries were prepared and readied for war. The Soviet Union was anticipating an attack.

HMSO Civil Defence Handbook No 10 (1963): Advising The Householder On Protection Against Nuclear Attack. 1963. 1st ed. London: H.M.S.O.

This is a handbook concerning the actions necessary to protect oneself from a nuclear attack; it is written and distributed by the Home Office and Central Office of Information of the United Kingdom (credible) The fact that it was published in 1963 gives clues to why it was necessary: Cold War tensions were climbing and nuclear attacks were bound to arrive at any second. The handbook was distributed to the British public. Although it was written by the British government, most of its information is applicable to other countries around the world in protecting against a nuclear attack. The handbook is not particularly significant to our topic but can provide some insight on the

dangers of a nuclear war erupting from the Cold War.

Hoffman, David. "I Had A Funny Feeling in My Gut" The Washington Post. February 10, 1999. Accessed March 19, 2017. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/coldwar/shatter021099b.htm>

The article was written by David E. Hoffman, a journalist of The Washington Post and the author of the Pulitzer-Prize winning book [\*The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and its Dangerous Legacy\*](#). This article touches more deeply about how Stanislav Petrov was treated after the event; he was questioned about why he had not recorded the event properly and that his investigators tried to turn him into a scapegoat for the false alarm. This article is helpful in proving that he was not given the recognition he deserved.

"Iran Air Flight 655". April 30, 2017. Accessed May 2, 2017. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran\\_Air\\_Flight\\_655](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran_Air_Flight_655).

This is a Wikipedia article about the Iran Air Flight 655, a passenger plane that was shot down by the United States in 1988. A similar event occurred in 1983 when the Soviet Union shot down a Korean passenger plane. The article itself provides analysis of the event through different details of the shoot down while discussing the accounts of the US and the Iranian government. Iran criticized the United States for the "intentionally performed and unlawful act", deeply impacting the relationship between the two countries to a degree evident today. Wikipedia acts as our starting point and links to other credible sources through data-mining; we verified its information through corroborative research like the New York Times article about the flight in our annotated bibliography.

JFK Library. "The Cold War - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum." Accessed November 13, 2016. <https://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/The-Cold-War.aspx>.

This article is published on the JFK Library website; the JFK Library Foundation is an organization dedicated to covering the life of the American President John F. Kennedy. They have an actual library/museum located in Boston, so it appears to be credible. The article gives a quick summary for the cold war from its beginning at the end of WWII to the Vietnam War. It shows the war from a diplomatic side, more specifically Kennedy's point of view. This article shows the deeply rooted tension between America and Soviet Union that only became tighter and tighter throughout the decades. The start of the tension was 40 years before the 1983 False Alarm incident, which surprised us. This gives up important context for our incident.

Jones, Nate. "The 1983 War Scare: 'The Last Paroxysm' of the Cold War Part I." May 16, 2013.

Accessed February 9, 2017. <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB426/>.

This is an article about the Cold War and the 1983 War Scare found on the

National Security Archive. There are multiple primary source documents but it provides, primarily, an analysis and interpretation. We used a piece of a speech that Yuri Andropov gave.

Mehan, Hugh, Charles E. Nathanson, and James M. Skelly. "Nuclear Discourse in the 1980s: The Unravelling Conventions of the Cold War." *Discourse & Society* 1, no. 2 (1990): 133-65. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42888727>.

This is a journal article published on JSTOR, a peer-reviewed academic scholarly journal. The article delves into the political situation of the Reagan Administration as it used nuclear deterrence against the Soviet Union. One phrase that struck out to me was "make more nuclear weapons to prevent nuclear war". This phrase encapsulates the theory of deterrence and the inherent irony in it. The article also mentions that the American government still wanted to prevail in any situation, and that they should try to target the Soviet Union's missile silos and leaders if possible.

Patterson, Thom. "The Downing of Flight 007: 30 Years Later, a Cold War Tragedy Still Seems

Surreal." *CNN* (Cable News Network), August 31, 2013.

<http://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/31/us/kal-flight-007-anniversary/>.

This is an article about the Korean Air Lines Flight 007 Incident by CNN (Cable News Network), a credible source. We used a map, two quotes from a CNN interview, and a piece of data from this CNN article.

Pedersen, Glen. "StanislavPetrov — World Hero." 2003. Accessed October 16, 2016. [http://www.brightstarsound.com/world\\_hero/article.html](http://www.brightstarsound.com/world_hero/article.html).

This article is published on a website dedicated to Stanislav Petrov and the 1983 false alarm incident. It gives further context to the incident, and more importantly, brings up the events before the false alarm incident and the consequences of Stanislav's decision. It says that Stanislav was heavily reprimanded by the authorities because he did not "carry out orders unfailingly", but was not actually punished, only forced into early retirement. In addition, it also describes many events before the 1983 false alarm incident that shows the tension of nuclear war between America and the Soviet Union at the time of the incident. This article gave us new food for thought, and made us appreciate Stanislav's actions even more. We can expand our research to include the events surrounding the 1983 false alarm incident to make Stanislav's stand more impressive. While the author is mostly anonymous, he cited from Washington Post, BBC News, etc.

"Stanislav Petrov: World Hero-Insight." Accessed February 8, 2017. [http://brightstarsound.com/world\\_hero/insight.html](http://brightstarsound.com/world_hero/insight.html).

This is a sub-page of the website described above. We used a quote from Bruce Blair in one of the answers to the questions.

Perle, Richard. 1985. "THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: Addressing Some Misconceptions". *Journal Of International Affairs* 39 (1): 23-29. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/24356359.pdf>.

This journal article addresses some common misconceptions of the Strategic Defense Initiative, an expensive missile defense system intended to replace the MAD doctrine. It was proposed by Ronald Reagan in March 1983, 6 months before the False Alarm Incident. Although the journal itself was published in 1985, most of its information still adds on to the context of the Cold War prior to the incident. Reagan stresses that the US needs to find a defensive approach to potential nuclear attacks rather than promising the act of retaliation and the threat of destruction. The journal is meant for critics of the SDI, as the author refutes some criticisms about the system while providing in-depth analysis. The author believes that the SDI is necessary for the US to maintain its control and position in the world. This causes an interpretation inclined to persuade readers to support the SDI; nevertheless, the source still proves valuable to provide a US perspective to the SDI and to the reasoning behind Reagan's decision.

Polanyi, John. 1980. "The Dangers Of Nuclear War". *Bulletin Of The American Academy Of Arts And Sciences* 34 (3): 5-9. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3823021.pdf>.

This is a part of a journal that discusses the dangers of nuclear war. Because the Cold War was capable of starting a nuclear war at any moment, this source helps in analyzing its effects and the potential dangers of nuclear arms. Published in 1980, the journal article was clearly influenced by the Cold War and the nuclear war it might cause. The author is a University professor at the University of Toronto, making the journal article credible. By analyzing the topics and ideas proposed in this article, we could better understand the true consequences of a nuclear war (not just nuclear weapons and explosions).

Reagan, Ronald. "Evil Empire Speech." *Reagan, "Evil Empire," speech text*. n.p., 1983.

<http://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/reagan-evil-empire-speech-text/>.

This is the full transcript of Ronald Reagan's "Evil Empire" speech organized by the U.S. Oratory Project, Voices of Democracy, a credible source. We quoted a portion of the script in our website.

"Ronald Reagan Wallpaper." July 26, 2016. Accessed February 9, 2017.

<http://www.hdbloggers.net/ronald-reagan-wallpaper-backgrounds/>.

This is a website devoted to publishing different kinds of wallpapers. We used a

Ronald Reagan wallpaper provided on this site in our website.

“R-7 Family of Launchers and ICBMs.” 2011. Accessed December 23, 2016.  
<http://www.russianspaceweb.com/r7.html>.

This article is written by Zak Anatoly, a native of Moscow but now lives in the United States. In addition to creating this website, he also works as a contributing writer to the *Air & Space Smithsonian* and the *Aerospace America* magazines. The article concerns Russian missile types like the R-7. We used an image of the R-7 ICBM from this website.

Sheetz, Samuel. “‘We Win; They Lose’: The Staggering Simplicity of Reagan’s Grand Strategy.”

December 10, 2011. Accessed February 9, 2017.  
<http://dailysignal.com/2011/12/10/we-win-they-lose-the-staggering-simplicity-of-reagan%E2%80%99s-grand-strategy/>.

This is an article about Ronald Reagan’s Cold War strategy with analysis by Charles Hill. The author is Samuel Sheetz, who have written several other articles on The Daily Signal, part of The Heritage Foundation. We used a quote from Reagan in our website.

*Soldiers of God - Cold War*. Produced by Patt Mitchell and Jeremy Isaacs. USA: CNN, 1998. DVD.

This is a section of the *Cold War* documentary produced by CNN. It is professionally made, aired on TV, and published by a well-known company, so it should be fairly credible factually; however, since an American company produced it, it offers mostly an American interpretation of the event. This section of the documentary focuses on the Soviet-Afghan war. When the Soviet military invaded Afghanistan in 1979, they were met with bitter resistance from the natives, who were actually secretly armed by the US. The US and Soviet Union did not fight each other directly, which made it a proxy war. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union was adamant on winning, which lead to many atrocities and the ravaged landscape of Afghanistan. Although this was not a direct conflict between the two countries, the US played an active role in opposing Soviet expansion, which raised the tension.

"The Olympic Boycott, 1980". 2009. *2001-2009.State.Gov*. <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/qfp/104481.htm>.

This is a short article about the Olympic Boycott that took place during the Cold War against the Soviet Union. It was a direct protest against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan a year earlier; nearly half the countries refused to send athletes to compete at the Olympic Games in Moscow. The boycott movement was largely supported in the US and also involved countries like Chile, South Korea, and unsurprisingly, China (after the Sino-Soviet split). This article is published by the U.S. Department of State Archive (2001-2009) and its information can be trusted. Since it is published by the U.S. Department of



State, it only provides an American view to the boycott. Nevertheless, this can help us further visualize the context of events leading up to the incident.

"United States Relations With Russia: The Cold War". 2009. *2001-2009.State.Gov*.  
<https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/85895.htm>.

This is a timeline (in text form) of major events of the Cold War. There are also descriptions along with the dates of the events, providing valuable context in a matter of minutes about everything that went on during the war. It is, however, a substantially credible source in both its information and the dates. Although it is an archive of state.gov, as a secondary source, it can still be used for events in the past. This source helps us understand more about the context of the Cold War and the different events that cause persistent tension between the two superpowers. We learned that there were a lot of attempts to reduce arms through treaties during the 1970s and 80s, gradually decreasing the tension after the Cuban Missile Crisis.

US History. "United States History." Accessed February 6, 2017. <http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1955.html>.

This is a website devoted to US history, having accurate information that could be verified on several other websites. We used a piece of information about the ICBM from this article.

Wilson Center. "Able Archer 83: The Secret History." November 3, 2016. Accessed November 25, 2016. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/able-archer-83-the-secret-history>.

This article is published under the Wilson Center, an organization "chartered as Congress as the official memorial for President Woodrow Wilson" that serves as a "policy forum for tackling global issues through independent research and open dialogue to inform actionable ideas for the policy community". It goes more in-depth about Able Archer 83, and especially the Soviet Union's reaction. The Soviet Union suspected that Able Archer 83 may be a cover up for a secret attack, and actively prepared in case it happened. This article is helpful because it shows that suspicion of missile attacks from the United States and that the Soviet Union was ready to retaliate.

Zak, Anatoly. "Oko Early-Warning Satellite." 2000. Accessed November 25, 2016. <http://www.russianspaceweb.com/oko.html>.

This article is written by Zak Anatoly, a native of Moscow but now lives in the United States. In addition to creating this website, he also works as a contributing writer to the *Air & Space Smithsonian* and the *Aerospace America* magazines. This article is about Oko, the satellite developed by the Soviet Union to detect and track launches of ballistic missiles, which malfunctioned during the 1983 False Alarm incident. This article is somewhat helpful because it gives us insight on how Oko works. It uses telescopes to

detect infrared radiation from the exhausts of ballistic missiles. With this article, we can visualize clearer about what caused the malfunction.

———. *Address to the Nation on the Soviet Attack on a Korean Civilian Airliner*. n.p., 1983.

<https://reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/speeches/1983/90583a.htm>.

This is a transcript of the speech that Ronald Reagan made about the Korean Airline Flight 007. We quoted him and used the video of this speech on our website.